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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper introduces a model of gender inequality and economic growth that focuses on the 
determination of women’s time allocation among market production, home production, child rearing, 
and child education. The theoretical model is based on Agénor (2012), but differs in several important 
dimensions. The model is calibrated using microlevel data of Asian economies, and numerous policy 
experiments are conducted to investigate how various aspects of gender inequality are related to the 
growth performance of the economy. The analysis shows that improving gender equality can 
contribute significantly to economic growth by changing females’ time allocation and promoting 
accumulation of human capital. We find that if gender inequality is completely removed, aggregate 
income will be about 6.6% and 14.5% higher than the benchmark economy after one and two 
generations, respectively, while corresponding per capita income will be higher by 30.6% and 71.1% in 
the hypothetical gender-equality economy. This is because fertility and population decrease as women 
participate more in the labor market. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: economic growth, gender inequality, human capital accumulation, labor market, overlapping 
generations model 
 
JEL codes: E24, E60, J13, J71 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of women in economic development has been a popular topic in academic and policy 
debates. The last half century has witnessed a drastic increase in labor participation of women in most 
developed and developing countries. During this period, the labor participation rate of women has 
been converging to that of men in most countries, and the gender gap in wages has narrowed down 
(Duflo 2010). Between 1980 and 2009, the global female labor participation rate increased from 
50.2% to 51.8%, while that of male labor participation decreased from 82% to 77.7%, resulting in the 
decline of the gender differentials from 32% to 26% (World Bank 2012). However, there is still 
significant underutilization and misallocation of women’s skills and talents. In many developing 
countries, inequality in access to quality education between girls and boys adversely impacts girls’ 
ability to build human and social capital, lowering their job opportunities and wage in labor markets. 
Significant barriers remain to women’s participation in labor markets (Elborgh-Woytek et al. 2013). 
Supply-side constraints, especially those related to fertility, marriage, and child-rearing, influence the 
determination of females’ labor market participation. There are also demand-side barriers in society 
that restrict women’s equitable access to jobs, skills development, and fair earnings. 
 
Although gender disparity in education and labor markets prevails worldwide, it is considered a 
very important policy issue in Asian economies. Tables 1 and 2 show significant gender gaps in 
educational opportunities, educational attainment, and labor market participation in selected Asian 
economies and advanced countries.  
 
The objective of this paper is to develop a model that can analyze the role of gender inequality 
on long-term economic growth. We use the model to investigate the determination of female labor 
market participation, human capital accumulation, and economic growth. We then calibrate the model 
for a typical Asian economy and conduct simulations to quantitatively measure the opportunity cost of 
gender inequality in terms of output foregone and the long-term productivity gains and income growth 
that can be obtained by removing the barriers preventing women from having equal access to 
education and employment opportunities.  
 
A key source of inequality between women’s and men’s participation in the labor force stems 
from the way women allocate their time. At all levels of incomes, women tend to do the majority of 
housework, and correspondingly, they spend less time on market work. Women in developing 
countries are likely to be involved more in housework than in market work (Berniell and Sánchez-
Páramo 2011, World Bank 2012). Our paper develops a model that can analyze the determination of 
women’s time allocation causing gender inequality in human capital accumulation and labor market 
participation, the economic costs of gender inequality, and the impacts of gender equality policies.  
 
Our model builds upon research on endogenous economic growth with human capital as the 
engine of growth (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1990; Ehrlich and Lui 1991). The studies in this area are 
based on the models of time allocation (Becker 1985) and the quality–quantity tradeoff in children 
(Becker and Lewis 1973), and they attempt to account for demographic transitions and persistent 
economic growth.  
 
Like the authors of these studies, we recognize that individual agents make a rational decision 
in allocating their time between labor supply, child-rearing, human capital investment in children, and 
contributing to household production.  We consider human capital investment in children by parents 
as a source of persistent economic growth. Our model thus investigates the interactions between 
women’s labor force participation, fertility, and economic growth via human capital accumulation.  
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Table 1: Gender Inequality in Education, 2010 
 
Country Average Years of Schooling 
Gross Secondary
Enrollment Ratios 
Gross Tertiary
Enrollment Ratios 
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Philippines 8.13 8.72 88.0* 81.3* 31.3* 25.3*
Kazakhstan 11.42 11.25 94.7 97.5 46.0 33.0
Sri Lanka 10.32 9.98 98.4 96.1 20.3 10.8
Singapore 11.22 10.34 - - - -
Thailand 8.01 7.88 86.0 81.0 56.2 44.0
People’s Republic of China 8.01 7.13 83.5 82.8 24.3 22.4
Viet Nam 7.48 6.81 - - 22.4 22.3
Bangladesh 6.20 5.69 52.9 47.0 7.8* 13.1*
Indonesia 8.10 7.20 78.8 78.1 23.2 26.6
India 7.59 4.81 62.4 67.5 15.2 21.0
Malaysia 10.66 10.21 65.9 67.9 40.8 33.2
Cambodia 5.69 3.96 - - 10.5 17.7
Japan 11.69 11.45 101.7 101.5 54.7 61.3
Republic of Korea 12.76 11.45 96.6 97.6 85.0 115.0
Pakistan 6.24 3.76 29.6 38.3 6.1* 7.2*
Reference   
Finland 11.58 11.64 109.7 104.8 103.6 84.9
Sweden 11.43 11.76 97.6 98.6 90.8 59.2
Germany 12.68 12.06 99.0 104.0 58.5+ 54.6+
United States 13.14 13.23 93.7 92.7 109.1 78.2
- = no data available, * indicates 2009 data, + indicates 2011 data. 
Sources: Barro and Lee 2013, and UNESCO 2012. 
 
Table 2: Labor Force Participation Rates, 2010 
 
Country Female Male All Female/Male 
Philippines 50.9 80.9 65.9 0.63 
Kazakhstan 74.0 81.0 77.4 0.91 
Sri Lanka 38.0 81.1 59.3 0.47 
Singapore 62.9 82.5 72.8 0.76 
Thailand 69.8 84.7 77.1 0.82 
People’s Republic of China 75.2 85.3 80.4 0.88 
Viet Nam 78.1 84.5 81.2 0.92 
Bangladesh 59.8 86.8 73.4 0.69 
Indonesia 53.2 86.3 69.7 0.62 
India 30.3 83.1 57.7 0.36 
Malaysia 46.3 78.9 62.8 0.59 
Cambodia 81.8 87.5 84.5 0.93 
Japan 63.2 84.8 74.0 0.75 
Republic of Korea 54.5 77.1 65.8 0.71 
Pakistan 23.0 85.9 54.9 0.27 
Reference  
Finland 72.5 76.7 74.6 0.95 
Sweden 76.7 82.2 79.5 0.93 
Germany 70.8 82.4 76.6 0.86 
United States 68.4 79.6 73.9 0.86 
Source: OECD 2012. 
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Cross-country and time-series evidence suggests that there is a U-shaped relationship 
between per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and female labor market participation (Elborgh-
Woytek et al. 2013). Boserup (1970) argues that men’s privileged access to education excludes women 
from the labor force during the early stage of development, and it is only later that women gain access 
to education and employment. On the other hand, Goldin (1990) interprets the U-shaped pattern as a 
strong income effect at the early stage and a dominant substitution effect at the later stage.  
 
Despite the general predictions of the positive effect of economic development on female 
labor market participation, it is not very clear that income increase alone can bring about gender 
equality in labor market participation. A survey by Cuberes and Teignier (2012) summarizes the three 
main channels through which increases in income reduce the gender gap in labor market participation, 
as follows: (i) the income elasticity channel (Becker and Lewis 1973), (ii) technological progress 
(Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005), and (iii) changes in women’s property rights (Doepke 
and Tertilt 2009). Other papers, like Fernandez (2009) and Dollar and Gatti (1999), highlight the 
importance of cultural and religious characteristics as determinants of female labor force participation. 
Steinberg and Nakane (2012) find that differences in public policies significantly explain the 
differences in female labor participation rates across countries. Our model considers cultural and 
social factors, including gender bias in child-rearing and education, bargaining power in home 
production, and labor market discrimination, as important determinants of females’ time allocation 
and labor market participation. 
 
There is a vast amount of literature on gender equality and growth. The existing theoretical 
literature emphasizes that gender equality influences growth via three channels: female labor market 
participation, average human capital stock, and fertility.  
 
The effects of gender gaps in education on economic growth arise primarily from the impact of 
female education on fertility and on the creation of human capital for the next generation. Female 
labor participation can have a mechanically direct effect on per capita GDP because resources for 
household production are diverted to market production, which the GDP measure captures.  
 
Galor and Weil (1996) argue that the increase in capital intensity that accompanies economic 
growth raises the relative wage of women, as economic development tends to provide higher rewards 
for attributes in which women possess a comparative advantage. In this context, an improvement in 
women’s average education decreases the relative wage gap between women and men, thus increasing 
women’s opportunity cost and inducing them to forego child-rearing and enter the labor market.  
 
Lagerlof (2003) shows that increasing gender equality in the levels of spouses’ human capital 
makes couples substitute quantity for quality of children, thus further raising human capital and 
income growth rates. 
 
An efficient allocation of female labor, especially well-educated female human capital, across 
occupations and industries can increase GDP. Esteve-Volart (2009) presents a model in which gender 
discrimination in labor markets reduces the human capital available in the economy and distorts the 
allocation of entrepreneurial talent across different occupations. Esteve-Volart presents supporting 
evidence using data from Indian states.  
 
A considerable number of empirical studies show the negative impacts on economic growth of 
gender inequality in education and employment. The majority of empirical papers support the theory 
indicating the negative effects of gender inequality on economic growth. Klasen (2002) uses cross-
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country and panel regressions to show that gender inequality in education has negative effects on 
economic growth directly by lowering the average level of human capital, and indirectly by lowering 
investment and population growth. Klasen and Lamanna (2009),  using cross-country data over the 
period 1960–1980, investigate to what extent gender gaps in labor force participation reduce economic 
growth. They find that gender gaps in education and employment significantly reduce economic 
growth. Dollar and Gatti (1999) and Barro and Lee (2013) also find a positive correlation between 
growth of per capita income and initial level of female school attainment after controlling for other 
factors such as initial per capita income and male school attainment.  
 
In contrast, Seguino (2000) finds evidence that gender inequality lowers women’s wages and 
has positive effects on growth via the effect on exports in exported-oriented economies. Berik, 
Rodgers, and Zveglich (2004); and Busse and Spielmann (2006) find that gender wage inequality is 
positively associated with comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods and thus has a positive 
effect on economic growth.  
 
Recent papers build models in which gender inequality in labor markets plays an important role 
in economic growth, and they estimate the quantitative effects based on the calibration of the models. 
Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) provide a framework to quantify the aggregate effects of gender 
inequality in wages. They introduce wage discrimination against women into a growth model with 
endogenous saving, fertility, and labor market participation. They calibrate their model using United 
States data and find that the wage gap has very large effects. It is estimated that a 50% increase in the 
gender wage gap would decrease income per capita by a quarter of the output.  
 
Agénor (2012), and Agénor and Canuto (2013) develop an overlapping generations (OLG) 
model of economic growth that accounts endogenously for women’s time allocation for home 
production, child-rearing, and market work. The model also accounts for bargaining between spouses, 
for gender bias in the form of work place discrimination, and for mothers’ time allocation for daughters 
and sons. The calibration shows that in a low-income country, the elimination of gender wage 
discrimination raises the steady-state growth rate by about 0.5% per annum.  
 
Cuberes and Teignier (2012) quantify the effects of gender inequality in labor markets by using 
a model of talent allocation. According to the paper’s simulations, if all women were excluded from 
managerial positions, output per worker would decrease by over 10%, and if all women were excluded 
from the labor force, the loss in income per capita would be almost 40%. 
 
Hsieh et al. (2013) present a model of occupational choice based on the principle of 
comparative advantage. They use United States census data to match the different equilibrium 
conditions generated by their model and estimate the implied occupational wage, frictions, and human 
capital gaps by group. They find that improved allocation of talent can explain between 17% and 20% 
of the output growth during the period 1960–2008. 
 
Our model most closely resembles that of Agénor (2012), and Agénor and Canuto (2013). 
Unlike theirs, however, our model explicitly considers the difference between the quantity and quality 
of children in terms of their costs, following Becker,  Murphy, and Tamura (1990), and in terms of the 
altruism in utility, as in Ehrlich and Lui (1991). We assume that there is a fixed cost per child and a 
distinct time-cost in educating children. This aspect enables us to investigate how relative cost 
changes affect fertility and human capital investment and consequently, also the labor supply and 
economic growth. We also assume that as part of the gender gap, husbands take limited responsibility 
in household production, and we analyze the effect of this situation on our model.  
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We calibrate the model to fit its steady-state values to the observed values from a typical 
Asian country. We then quantitatively assess the cost of gender inequality for foregone outputs and 
the impacts of gender-based policies on females’ labor market participation and economic growth.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section II introduces the formal model. In section III, we 
calibrate the model and derive the benchmark steady state characterized by the balanced growth path. 
In section IV, we experiment with five gender equality policies and estimate the cost of gender 
inequality. Section V provides some suggestions for future research and concludes our paper. 
 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
A. Model Structure 
 
Households 
 
Every individual lives across three periods: childhood, adulthood (middle age), and retirement (at old 
age). Each individual is endowed with one unit of time each in childhood and adulthood, but no units 
of time in the period of retirement. Each individual’s gender, male or female, is determined at birth. 
Individuals do not face any decisions in childhood and spend all of their time toward obtaining an 
education. Children rely on their parents for education. In adulthood, two individuals of the opposite 
sex marry randomly and give birth to children. We assume that half of these children are sons, and the 
other half, daughters. 
 
At the same time, adults supply their time to the labor market and receive wages, which 
constitute the only income for the family. A female adult needs to divide her time toward four uses: 
(i) market production, (ii) home production, (iii) child-rearing, and (iv) child education.1 In contrast, 
we assume for simplicity that a male adult allocates all his time between market production (i.e., 
working in the official labor market) and home production. We assume that the time spent by a male 
on home production is ݂ times the time spent by a female on home production, where ݂ represents 
the bargaining power of a female. Since he spends the rest of his time on market production, the male 
essentially has no decision problems regarding his allocation of time. 
 
Every period, two types of goods, marketed goods and home goods, are produced. Marketed 
goods are produced by firms and can be consumed or saved, and the saving will be turned into capital 
and used for production by firms in the next period. On the other hand, home goods consist of 
activities like cooking and cleaning; they are produced at home and consumed in the same period. 
 
Only the female adult spends her time in activities concerning children, and she does so in two 
dimensions. First, she devotes time to childcare, and this time increases proportionately to the number 
of children. She also spends time in the education of her children, allotting a fixed share (ͩͪ ൑ α ൏ ͩ	) of 
education time on sons and the remainder on daughters, indicating that there is a bias in parental 
preferences toward sons. The time spent on education also increases proportionately to the number of 
children. 
 
                                                                
1  We ignore leisure by assuming that leisure is a fixed fraction of total time or is included in home production. 
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Children’s education depends on three factors: the mothers’ education level, the mothers’ time 
for education, and the government spending on education. Children’s education is built into their own 
human capital when they become adults and this human capital determines their efficiency of labor.2 
When individuals retire, they consume whatever is returned from their savings. They do not leave any 
assets after death. 
 
Firms 
 
Firms produce the marketed goods by using capital, and male and female labor. They distribute the 
marginal product of male adults’ labor, but only a portion of the marginal product of female adults’ 
labor is distributed to female adults, reflecting discrimination against female adults in the labor market.  
 
Government 
 
The government spends on education by taxing the wage income of male and female workers. The 
government cannot borrow, and hence, the budget is balanced in every period. For simplicity, we do 
not consider other distortionary taxes or productive public expenditures in the model.  
 
B. Formal Structure of the Model 
 
There is a continuum of identical households having the following utility function at time t: 
 
௧ܷ ൌ ߟ௖ ͩͩିఙ ܿ௧ͩିఙ ൅ ߟ௤
ͩ
ͩିఙ ݍ௧ͩିఙ ൅ ߟ௘௠
ͩ
ͩିఙ ൬ቀ
௣೎௡೟
ͪ ቁ
ఋ ݁௧ାͩ௠ ൰
ͩିఙ
  
൅ߟ௘௙ ͩͩିఙ ൬ቀ
௣೎௡೟
ͪ ቁ
ఋ ݁௧ାͩ௙ ൰
ͩିఙ
൅ ௣ಲͩାఘ
ͩ
ͩିఙ ܿ௧ାͩͩିఙ   (1) 
 
where ܿ௧  ( ܿ௧ାͩ ) is the family’s total consumption in adulthood (retirement); ݍ௧  denotes the 
consumption (and production) of home goods; ݊௧  denotes the number of children (of which half are 
sons, and the other half, daughters); ݌௖  is the probability of survival from childhood to adulthood 
(hence, the numbers of surviving sons and daughters are the same and equal to ௣೎௡೟ͪ );
3
 ݁௧ାͩ௠  (݁௧ାͩ௙ ሻ refers 
to the education level of sons (daughters), which will determine the efficiency of male (female) 
workers at t + 1; ߩ ൐ ͨ  denotes the time discount rate; ߪିͩ  is the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution; and ݌஺ the probability of survival from adulthood to retirement. The coefficient jC  is the 
relative preference for today’s consumption, ߟ௤  is the relative preference for home-produced goods, 
and ߟ௘௠ (ߟ௘௙) is the relative preference for sons’ (daughters’) education. 
 
The time constraint for the female is as follows: 
 
 ݄௧௪ ൅ ݄௧௤ ൅ ݄௧ோ ൅ ݄௧௘ ൌ ͩ (2) 
                                                                
2  In this model, we assume that females’ education level determines human capital accumulation. Incorporating the role of 
male education in human capital accumulation would not change the implications of the model qualitatively. In the 
balanced growth path, female and male human capital should grow at the same rate. We can also consider that females’ 
time for the child’s education includes time for looking after the child’s health. Then, human capital is a broader concept 
that includes health capital.  
3  The model can be easily extended to assume that the survival rate varies by gender and changes positively with parents’ 
time for child-rearing. These assumptions/extensions will not significantly affect the implications of the model.  
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where ݄௧௪ is the female adult’s time allocated to market production, and	݄௧௤ , ݄௧ோ , and ݄௧	௘  are the time 
she allocates to home production,	child-rearing, and	child education, respectively. We assume that 
݄௧ோ ൌ ݒ݌௖݊௧	and ݄௧௘ ൌ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘	, where ݒ is the rearing time needed per child, and ߳௧௘	is the average 
education time spent for each child.
4
 We also assume that the female adult divides the amount of time 
for education into the time spent on sons, 0 < b < 1, and that on daughters, 1 − b. Hence, the time 
allocated to each son and each daughter are ܾͪ߳௧௘  and ͪሺͩ െ ܾሻ߳௧௘ , respectively. The time constraint 
can then be represented as follows: 
 
 ݄௧௪ ൅ ݄௧௤ ൅ ݒ݌௖݊௧ 	൅ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘ ൌ ͩ (3) 
 
The home production function is
5
 
 
 ݍ௧ ൌ ݍതሺ݄௧௤ ൅ ݄௧௠ሻఊሾ൫݁௧௙൯
ఞሺ݁௧௠ሻͩିఞሿ (4) 
 
where ݄௧௠ ൌ ݂݄௧௤ , and ݂ represents the bargaining power of a female. When the bargaining power of a 
female increases, ݂ increases and so the male shares a greater burden of home production.6 We 
assume that the time spent by a male is perfectly substitutable for the time spent by a female. 
However, we assume that the education of a female and male takes on the Cobb–Douglas functional 
form, where ߯ and ͩ െ ߯ are the output elasticity of female and male education, respectively. 
 
The education level of children, which determines productivity in adulthood, is influenced by 
three factors: (i) the average government spending on education per (surviving) child, (ii) the mother’s 
human capital, ݁௧௙, and (iii) the time the mother allocates to each child.7  
 
 ݁௧ାͩ௠ ൌ ݁̅ሺ ఓீ೟௣೎௡೟ೌ ே೟/ͪሻ
ఔͩሺ݁௧௙ሻͩିఔͩሺܾͪ߳௧௘ሻఔͪ  (5) 
 
 ݁௧ାͩ௙ ൌ ݁̅ሺ ఓீ೟௣೎௡೟ೌ ே೟/ͪሻ
ఔͩሺ݁௧௙ሻͩିఔͩሾͪሺͩ െ ܾሻ߳௧௘ሿఔͪ  (6) 
 
where ܩ௧  is total government spending, ߤ is an indicator of efficiency of government spending, ௧ܰ 	is the 
number of individuals of generation t, ݊௧௔ is the average number of children in the households, and	݁௧௙	is 
the level of mothers’ human capital. Since we assume a representative household, ݊௧௔ ൌ ݊௧  holds in 
equilibrium. From (5) and (6), ௘೟శͩ
೘
௘೟శͩ೑
ൌ ሺ ௕ͩି௕ሻఔͪ . 
 
                                                                
4  We assume that child education involves home tutoring, which is measured by time allocated by female adults, ݄௧௘.  As 
shown in Equations (5) and (6), the female adults’ education level and the government spending on education also 
influence the productivity of female adults’ time in educating children. 
5  Home production is assumed to be positively related to the education levels of the mother and the father. This 
assumption enables market goods and home goods production to grow along a balanced growth path over time. 
6  For simplicity, we assume that f is exogenously determined and constant. We can allow that f increases as females’ 
education increases and reduces its gap with the males’. The main results will not change much with this new assumption. 
Note that females’ time allocated to home production, ݄௧௤ , decreases as female wage (income) rises (see (A7) in the 
Appendix).  
7  The formulas for children’s human capital do not include the role of private educational spending. However, the mothers’ 
time can be interpreted as comprising private educational spending. The model can be extended to include the allocation 
of family income to education of children, though the solution of the model becomes more complicated.  
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The household budget constraint at t and t + 1 are:8 
 
 ܿ௧ ൅ ݏ௧ ൌ ሺͩ െ ߬ሻݓ௧ு  (7) 
 
 ܿ௧ାͩ ൌ ሺͩା௥೟శͩሻ௦೟௣ಲ  (8) 
 
where ߬ ∈ ሺͨ,ͩሻ is the tax rate, ݏ௧ refers to the saving, ݎ௧ାͩ is the interest rate between t and t + 1, and ݓ௧ு  is the total gross wage income for the household. 
 
 ݓ௧ு ൌ ݁௧௠ሺͩ െ ݄௧௠ሻݓ௧௠ ൅ ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙ 
 
 ൌ ݁௧௠ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧௤ሻݓ௧௠ ൅ ݁௧௙ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ െ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘ሻݓ௧௙  (9) 
 
In this expression, ݁௧௠ሺͩ െ ݄௧௠ሻ and ݁௧௙݄௧௪ measures in efficiency units the labor supply by male 
and female adults, respectively, and ݓ௧௠ and ݓ௧௙  are the effective market wages for male adults and 
female adults, respectively. 
 
The household maximizes utility (1) with respect to ܿ௧ , ܿ௧ାͩ , ݄௧௤ , ߳௧௘ , and ݊௧  subject to 
constraints (3)–(9). From the first order conditions for ܿ௧  and ܿ௧ାͩ, we easily obtain  
 
 ሺ௖೟శͩ௖೟ ሻ
ఙ ൌ ͩା௥೟శͩఎ೎ሺͩାఘሻ (10) 
 
From (10), the saving rate is derived as follows: 
 
 ߠ௧ ൌ ͩ െ ͩͩା ುಲͩశೝ೟శͩሺ
ͩశೝ೟శͩ
ആ೎ሺͩశഐሻሻͩ/഑
 (11) 
 
Market production is accomplished by identical firms whose number is normalized to unity. 
Each firm i’s production function takes the following form: 
 
 ௧ܻ௜ ൌ തܻሺܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ ௧ܰ௠,௜ሻఈሺܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ ௧ܰ௙,௜ሻఈሺܭ௧௜ሻͩିͪఈ  (12) 
 
where ߙ ∈ ሺͨ,ͩሻ is the elasticity of output with respect to male and female effective labor, both of 
which are assumed to be the same. ܧ௧௠ and ܧ௧௙  are average male and female labor productivity 
(education level), respectively, and ܪ௧௠ and ܪ௧௪  are average male and female adult’s time allocated to 
market production, respectively. ௧ܰ
௠,௜ and ௧ܰ
௙,௜  are the numbers of male and female workers, 
respectively, and ܭ௧௜	is the amount of capital stock employed by firm i. 
 
Profits of a firm i are represented as follows: 
 
 Π௧௜ ൌ ௧ܻ௜ െ ൫ݓ௧௠ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ ௧ܰ௠,௜ ൅ ݓ௧௙ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ ௧ܰ௙,௜൯ െ ݎ௧ܭ௧௜ (13) 
 
                                                                
8  We assume that the savings made by adults who do not survive to old age are confiscated by the government and equally 
distributed in lump sum to the surviving adults when they become old. Hence, the return rate of saving, ሺͩା௥೟ሻ௣ಲ , is higher 
than the actual interest rate, ͩ ൅ ݎ௧. 
A Model of Gender Inequality and Economic Growth   |   9 
 
where the price of the marketed good is normalized to unity, and ݎ௧  is the rental rate of capital, which is 
identical to the rate of return to saving. Taking input prices as given, the firm maximizes profits with 
respect to the number of male and female workers and with respect to capital. We further assume that 
due to discrimination in the labor market, female workers receive only a fraction ݀ ∈ ሺͨ,ͩሻ of their 
marginal product. Then, the optimal choices of the firm satisfy the following equations: 
 
 ݓ௧௠ ൌ ఈ௒೟
೔
ா೟೘ு೟೘ே೟೘,೔	
	, 	ݓ௧௙ ൌ ௗఈ௒೟
೔
ா೟೑ு೟ೢ ே೟೑,೔
 , 	ݎ௧ ൌ ሺͩ െ ͪߙሻ ௒೟
೔
௄೟೔ (14) 
 
In equilibrium, ௧ܰ
௠,௜ ൌ ௧ܰ௠, 	 ௧ܰ௙,௜ ൌ 	 	 ௧ܰ௙,	and ܭ௧௜ ൌ ܭ௧  for all i, and the aggregate output is 
 
 ௧ܻ ൌ ׬ ௧ܻ௜ͩͨ ൌ തܻሺܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ ௧ܰ௠ሻఈሺܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ ௧ܰ௙ሻఈሺܭ௧ሻͩିͪఈ  (15) 
 
From (14), the following relation holds between ݓ௧௠ and ݓ௧௙ : 
 
 ݓ௧௠ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ ൌ ݀ିͩݓ௧௙ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪  (16) 
 
In equilibrium, the following equalities hold: ݁௧௠ ൌ ܧ௧௠, ݁௧௙ ൌ ܧ௧௙ , ݄௧௠ ൌ ܪ௧௠ , and ݄௧௙ ൌ ܪ௧௙.  
 
The government finances its expenditure on education by taxing the wage income.9 We 
assume that the government budget is balanced in every period: 
 
 ܩ௧ ൌ ߬൫ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ ௧ܰ௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ ௧ܰ௙ݓ௧௙൯ ൌ ߬൫ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ݓ௧௙൯ ே೟ͪ ൌ ݃௧
ே೟
ͪ   (17) 
 
where ݃௧ ൌ ߬൫ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ݓ௧௙൯, and ߬ is the tax rate. In equilibrium, from (14), 
 
 ݃௧ ൌ ߬൫ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ݓ௧௙൯ ൌ ߬൫݁௧௠݄௧௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙൯=τሺ1+݀ିͩሻ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙ 
 ൌ ͪ߬ሺͩ ൅ ݀ሻ	ߙ ௒೟ே೟ (18) 
 ܩ௧ ൌ ߬ሺͩ ൅ ݀ሻ	ߙ ௧ܻ  
 
The competitive equilibrium satisfies the following three conditions: 
 
(i) The household maximizes utility (1) with respect to ܿ௧, ܿ௧ାͩ, ݊௧, ݄௧௪, 	݄௧௤, 	݄௧ோ, and ݄௧௘ . 
(ii) The firm maximizes profits with respect to ௧ܰ
௠,	௜ , 		 ௧ܰ௙,	௜ , and ܭ௧௜ . 
(iii) The markets are cleared. In particular, the asset market clearing condition requires that 
total savings by all households (ͨ.ͭ ௧ܰሻ in period t be equal to the total capital stock at the 
beginning of period (t + 1): ͨ.ͭ ௧ܰݏ௧ ൌ ௧ܰ௙ݏ௧ ൌ ܭ௧ାͩ. 
 
We assume, for simplicity, that profits accrued due to female discrimination in the labor 
market are kept by firms and not distributed to households.10 
                                                                
9  The model can be easily extended to allow nondistortionary tax financing public education expenditures or unproductive 
government spending that can be reallocated to the education sector. This extension effectively increases the 
government’s contribution to education spending, leading to improved economic growth. 
10  The alternative assumption that the profits are redistributed to households as lump sum transfers would not change the 
main results. 
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There are no closed-form solutions except for ߳௧௘ : ߳௧௘= జͪ௩௉೎ሺఋିజͪሻ. We obtain solutions for other 
variables numerically. We can easily verify that ௒೟ே೟ and	
௄೟
ே೟ grow at the same rate as ݁௧
௙ in the balanced 
growth path. Hence, females’ education (and males’ education, that is, from (5) and (6), a 
multiplicative of females’ education) is the key to perpetual growth. 
 
The growth rate of per capita GDP in the steady state is:11 
 
 ͩ ൅ ߛ௒/ே ൌ ͪ തܻΓͩ ሺͩ െ ݂݄௤∗ሻఈሺͩ െ ݄௤∗ െ ݒ݌௖݊∗ െ ݌௖݊∗߳௘∗ሻఈሺ݇∗ሻିͪఈ݀ߙΦߠ∗ሺ ௖ܲ݊∗ሻିͩ  (19) 
 
where the variables with * are steady-state values, Γͩ ൌ ሺ ௕ͩି௕ሻఈఔͪ , and ݇௙∗ ൌ ሺ
௄
௘೑ே೑ሻ∗. 
 
 
III. CALIBRATION AND BALANCED GROWTH PATH 
 
Most parameter values are sourced from the macroeconomics literature and from Agénor (2012). The 
rest of our parameters are derived from the calibration of our model to fit the steady-state values, 
which in turn are derived from the average values from East and South Asia for the period 2005–2010, 
as reported in the World Development Indicators by the World Bank and the Barro-Lee (2013) data. 
The sourced parameters are as follows: 
 
(i) Fertility: 2.74, 
(ii) Annual per capita income growth rate: 3.32%, 
(iii) Net domestic saving rate: 15.83%,12 
(iv) Female and male labor force participation rate: 57.69% and 80.14%, and 
(v) Total years of schooling for women and men aged 15-64: 6.69 and 7.99. 
 
The value of parameter b in our model can be directly derived from (5) and (6): ݁௧ାͩ௠ /݁௧ାͩ௙  = ሺܾ ሺͩ െ ܾሻ⁄ ሻఔͪ  = Total years of schooling for men/Total years of schooling for women.  
 
Since the male labor force participation rate in our model is (1  ݂݄௧௤), parameter f can be 
estimated from the equation 
 
݂݄௧௤ = 1  0.8014 
 
where ݄௧௤ is endogenously determined in our model. From the calibration with the other average values, 
we are able to pin down the following parameter values: 
 
 
v = 3.204, 
 = 0.687, 
݁̅ = 3.836, and 
ݍത = 7.6000. 
 
                                                                
11  See the Appendix for the derivation. 
12  Gross saving rate (21.83%) – depreciation (6%). 
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Table 3 reports the parameter values used for the calibration, and Table 4 presents the steady-
state values of key variables in the model economy. 
 
Table 3: Calibrated Parameters 
 
Parameter Value Description
Households 
ρ 0.6867 Annual discount rate
σ 0.8 Inverse of elasticity of substitution 
஺ܲ, 	 ஼ܲ  0.982, 0.854 Average adult, child survival probability 
δ  1.05 Preference parameter for number of children 
ߟ௘௠, 	ߟ௘௙ 0.2, 0.2 Preference parameters for children’s education 
ߟ௤ 12 Family preference parameter for home production
ߟ௖  3.5 Family preference parameter for today’s consumption
ݒ 3.2041 Rearing time per child
Home output 
γ 0.122 Curvature of production function 
݂ 0.6617 Bargaining power of a female 
ݍത 7.5997 
߯ 0.8 Output elasticity of females
Market output 
α 0.4 Elasticity with respect to (w.r.t.) labor input 
d 0.6 Gender bias in the workplace
തܻ  1 
 
Human capital 
߭ͩ 0.4 Elasticity w.r.t. public spending in education 
߭ͪ 0.3 Elasticity w.r.t. public-private ratio 
ܾ 0.6438 Gender bias in education
݁̅ 3.8355 
Government 
τ 0.163 Tax rate on marketed output
μ 0.39 Education spending efficiency parameter 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 4: Steady-State Solutions for the Benchmark Economy 
 
Variables Value Description
݌௖݊ 2.74 Fertility rate (݊ = 3.21)
݄௠ 0.8014 Labor force participation rate of males (݂݄௧௤  = 1-0.8014) 
݄௪ 0.5769 Labor force participation rate of females 
݁௠
݁௙  
7.99/6.69 Male–female ratio of total schooling years (b = 0.6438) 
ߠ 0.1583 Net savings rate 
ߛ௒/ே  1.664 Per capita growth rate (= 1.033230 – 1) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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IV. GENDER-BASED POLICIES 
 
A. Changes in Steady States 
 
We consider the following five policies to promote gender equality:  
 
(i) Lower gender bias in education: a decrease in ܾ	,  
(ii) Lower time cost for child-rearing: a decrease in ݒ	,  
(iii) Lower discrimination in the labor market: an increase in ݀	,  
(iv) Higher government expenditure on education: an increase in ߬	,13	and 
(v) More time spent by a male on home production: an increase in ݂. 
 
The values in the first row of Table 5 denote the benchmark steady state derived from the 
economy with the given parameter values. The next five rows report the new steady states that would 
be reached by the economy if the above five gender equality policies are implemented.14  
 
Table 5: Impacts of Gender Equality Policies 
 
 
Female labor 
participation (݄௪ሻ 
Household 
production 
(݄௤ሻ  
Fertility 
(n) 
Child-
rearing 
ሺ݄ோሻ
K
e୤N 
Annual 
Interest 
rate (%) 
Saving 
rate (%) 
܇
܍܎ۼ 
Annual per 
capita 
growth (%) 
Aggregate
growth 
(%) 
Steady-State Values 
in the Benchmark 
Economy 0.5769 0.3002  3.2099 0.0878 0.6690 7.8530 15.83 14.483 3.3183 4.4098 
b: 0.6438  0.55 
(lower gender bias 
in education) 0.5744 0.3018  3.2297 0.0884 0.5997 7.9766 15.95 13.490 3.4536 4.5679 
v: 3.2041  3.0 
(lower time cost 
for child-rearing) 0.5764 0.3001  3.4432 0.0882 0.6544 7.9086 15.89 14.415 3.1473 4.4810 
d: 0.6  0.7 (lower 
discrimination in 
the labor market) 0.5944 0.2925  2.9510 0.0807 0.7364 7.6530 15.65 14.979 3.5644 4.3655 
τ: 0.163  0.2 
(increase 
government 
expenditure on 
education) 0.5722 0.3023  3.2768 0.0897 0.5825 8.1994 16.16 14.032 3.5283 4.6940 
f: 0.6617  0.8  
(increase in 
female’s bargaining 
power at home) 0.5967 0.2755  3.3356 0.0913 0.6554 7.9139 15.89 14.460 3.2632 4.4878 
Notes: The figures in block letters indicate that the steady-state values of the variables increase with the shocks.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
When the rearing time needed per child, ݒ, is lowered from 3.2 to 3, ࡷࢋࢌࡺ decreases, which raises 
the growth rate of aggregate output.15 Since a decrease in ݒ implies that the cost involved in increasing 
the quantity of children is lowered, the optimal decision of females is to increase their fertility. In this 
                                                                
13  Although an increase in educational expenditure should be regarded as a growth-oriented policy rather than a gender-
based policy, mothers’ time for children’s education is influenced by public education policy in our framework.   
14  As shown in Figure 1, when the five gender equality policies are implemented, all the endogenous variables respond 
immediately and then converge to new steady states almost completely within three generations. Once new steady states 
are attained, there will be no further adjustments. 
15  While the government’s role in reducing time cost for child-rearing is not explicitly modeled, there are several ways for the 
government to influence it. For example, the government can provide nursing facilities to save time spent by parents in 
rearing children. Government can also distribute immunization medicines to improve children’s health so that the time is 
more efficiently spent on child-rearing. 
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case, females’ time for labor market participation decreases, though only by a small magnitude. In this 
case, the increase in the fertility rate dominates, and the increased population growth rate lowers the 
growth rate of the per capita output. 
 
Interestingly, the impact of lowering the discrimination in the labor market, ݀, is just the 
opposite; that is, the growth rate of per capita output increases but the growth rate of aggregate output 
decreases. When the distortion in the labor market is reduced, females’ time allocated to market 
production significantly increases, contributing to the increase in per capita output growth. However, 
the fertility is also lowered, which eventually leads to the decrease in the growth rate of aggregate 
output. 
 
When policies lowering gender bias are adopted, females’ time allocated to market production 
decreases, but the increase in human capital accumulation contributes to the increase in growth rates 
of both output and per capita output. 
 
If the government increases its expenditure on education by increasing the tax rate from 0.163 
to 0.2, both per capita output and aggregate output grow faster. In this case, ࡷࢋࢌࡺ decreases, which 
contributes to an increase in the growth rate of per capita output. Further, since the fertility rate 
increases, the growth rate of aggregate output also increases. 
 
Finally, equalizing the time spent by a male and female on home production, that is, raising ݂, 
lowers the growth rate of per capita output and increases the growth rate of aggregate output.  
 
B. Transition Dynamics 
 
While Table 5 shows how the steady states change if the gender equality policies are implemented, the 
benefits/costs of these policies can be estimated only when the transition dynamics between steady 
states are also taken into consideration. For example, even if a new steady state is desirable, it may take 
too long to reach that particular steady state, and the economy may suffer during the transition period. 
Then, the actual benefits can be much smaller, or the policies may turn out not to be beneficial at all. 
 
Since the utility maximization solution for an individual with rational expectations in our model 
depends on the next-period value of the interest rate, the forward simulation method is not 
appropriate for our case. Instead, we utilize the backward-shooting method for simulation. Knowing 
that the model’s economy reaches a new steady state when a particular parameter is changed, we start 
from the new steady state, trace backward along the transitional dynamics path, and introduce a 
minuscule perturbation from the new steady-state value into the model, the variable being ݇௧ାͩ௙  in our 
simulation.  
 
In Figure 1, we illustrate the transition dynamics of the three variables of most interest. In 
Figure 1.1, we present the transition dynamics of fertility when the five gender equality policies are 
implemented. The time to reach a new steady state is seemingly quite short; after about two periods, 
the fertility level almost reaches a new steady state. However, since a period in the model is equivalent 
to a generation, two periods translates to about 60 years, which is considerably long. The transition 
dynamics is quite straightforward: the fertility level changes monotonically and almost linearly from 
one steady state to another. 
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In Figure 1.2, we present the transition dynamics of females’ time allocated to market 
production when the five gender equality policies are implemented. Again, the transition time takes 
about two periods, and the transition dynamics are monotonic and almost linear. Finally, Figure 1.3 
illustrates the transition dynamics of the per capita output growth rate. While there is a small 
overshooting when b is lowered, the other aspects of the transition dynamics are quite similar to those 
found in the previous two cases.  
 
Finally, in Figure 1.4, we report a sensitivity analysis of the model. Since the parameter values 
are likely to vary across countries, the impact of a change in any parameter can also differ depending 
on other parameter values for different countries. As an example, we illustrate how the impact of a 
change in b from 0.64 to 0.55 varies across different values of the time discount rate ߩ.		In the upper 
panel, as ߩ increases, the labor force participation rate decreases for both values of b (0.55 and 0.64) 
because today’s agents prefer less saving and more leisure consumption. More importantly, the dotted 
line corresponding to the lower value of b (0.55) is located below the solid line corresponding to the 
benchmark value of b (0.64), indicating that the change in b from 0.64 to 0.55 decreases the labor 
participation rate, as shown in Table 5. Although we show only the impact of the change in b on the 
labor force participation rate at the benchmark parameter value of ߩ (0.67) in Table 5, the figure shows 
that its impact is essentially the same qualitatively and quantitatively for different values of ߩ, as the 
two lines are almost parallel. 
 
In the middle panel, we illustrate the same exercise for the impact of a change in b on the per 
capita growth rate. The figure shows that for both values of b, the per capita growth rate decreases as ߩ 
increases. As shown for the benchmark parameter value of ߩ in Table 5, the dotted line corresponding 
to a lower b (0.55) is located above the solid line corresponding to the benchmark value of b (0.64). 
Again, the impact of the change in b is essentially the same in size for different values of ߩ since the 
two lines are almost parallel. Finally, the lower panel illustrates the case for the fertility rate. The two 
lines are again almost parallel, indicating that the impact of the change in b on the fertility rate is 
virtually identical for different values of ߩ.  
 
C. Output Costs of Gender Inequality 
 
We can measure the output costs of gender inequality by comparing the performances of the 
benchmark economy with those of a hypothetical economy with no gender inequality. Figure 2 
illustrates the alternative transitional dynamics paths of the economy with gender inequality (ܾ	 = 
0.6438, ݀	 = 0.61, and f = 0.6617) and that without it (ܾ	 = 0.5, ݀	 = 1, and f = 1). The first figure (Figure 
2.1) shows the time paths of per capita income, while the second (Figure 2.2) shows the paths of 
aggregate income. The benchmark economy is represented in these figures by solid lines, and the 
hypothetical economy without gender inequality, by the dashed lines. In our exercise, the hypothetical 
economy experiences the abolishment of gender inequality in period 1. 
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Figure 1: Transitional Dynamics between Steady States 
 
1.1 Transitional Dynamics of Fertility 
 
continued on next page 
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Figure 1   continued 
1.2 Transitional Dynamics of Females’ Time Allocated to Market 
Production 
 
continued on next page 
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Figure 1   continued 
1.3 Transitional Dynamics of Per Capita Output Growth 
 
continued on next page 
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Figure 1   continued 
Figure 1.4:  Sensitivity Analysis—Variations in Parameter ρ with 
Different Values of b 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2: Output Costs of Gender Inequality: Transitional Dynamics  
With and Without Gender Inequality 
 
2.1 Transitional Dynamics of Per Capita Income 
 
 
 
2.2 Transitional Dynamics of Aggregate Income 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 2.1 reports that the per capita income of the hypothetical economy will be 30.2% higher 
than the benchmark economy after one generation; that is, 30 years in our model. The gap will be 
much larger after two generations, growing to 71.1%. Figure 2.2 shows that the aggregate income in the 
hypothetical economy will be 6.6% and 14.5% higher than the benchmark economy after one and two 
generations, respectively. We note that the gap in aggregate income is smaller, because fertility—and 
thus population—is smaller in the hypothetical economy as women participate more in the labor 
market that has less gender inequality.  
 
According to the simulation results, in the hypothetical economy, the fertility rate becomes 
2.642, lower than the corresponding value of 3.21 in the benchmark economy, while the female labor 
market participation rate becomes 0.662, higher than the corresponding value of 0.5769 in the 
benchmark economy. Note that in our framework, the female labor force participation rate increases in 
the economy with no gender bias in education and the labor market, but the gap with males still exists 
due to females’ allocation of time in child-rearing and caring. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The paper constructed a macrolevel theoretical framework to explain the determination of female 
labor market participation, human capital accumulation, and economic growth in Asian economies. 
We applied this common framework to quantitatively analyze the output cost of gender inequality in a 
typical Asian economy.  
 
We found that the output cost of gender inequality is quite sizable. If gender inequality is 
completely removed, the per capita income will be 30.2% higher than the benchmark economy after 
one generation and 71.1% higher after two generations. We also found that the aggregate income in the 
hypothetical gender-equal economy will be 6.6% and 14.5% higher than the benchmark economy after 
one and two generations, respectively. These results indicate that by eliminating the gender inequality, 
the annual growth rates of per capita income and aggregate income can be enhanced by approximately 
1% and 0.2%, respectively. We believe that these growth-enhancing effects of gender equality are 
larger than or at least comparable to those of most other types of policies contemplated in developing 
countries. We also found that gender equality policies that lower childcare cost or increase males’ time 
for home production can contribute positively to aggregate output growth. However, these policies 
can also increase fertility, which leads to lower per capita income growth.  
 
We believe our methodologies are easily applicable to individual economies in Asia. The model 
can be modified to incorporate country-specific factors associated with gender inequality in education 
and in labor market participation in each Asian economy. For example, our framework can be extended 
by including additional features like an informal sector or multiple sectors, public infrastructure 
spending, males’ time allocation for child-rearing and education, international trade, and direct 
investment. These extensions can explain a specific country’s situation in gender equality and 
economic development and can be analyzed without much difficulty.
16
 Further, microlevel data from 
national censuses or household surveys can be used to provide better information for calibrating the 
model’s parameters for each economy. Using the modified theoretical framework and more precise 
calibrations, we can conduct simulations to estimate the contributions of various country-specific 
gender equality policies toward promoting economic growth in individual economies. 
 
A few caveats are in order. Like most macroeconomic policies, our results indicate that a 
particular policy in our analysis is not likely to exert a positive impact simultaneously on multiple policy 
targets of our concern such as female labor market participation, economic growth, and fertility. For 
instance, lowering market discrimination against women will evidently encourage more women to 
participate in the labor market. However, this policy will raise the opportunity cost of time for women, 
which will lower fertility. Government subsidies for childcare will reduce cost of child-rearing and 
hence raise fertility; however, due to substitution in time use, this policy will decrease female labor 
market participation and human capital investment in children and likewise decrease the economic 
growth rate in this model. Hence, policies seeking to promote gender-equal economic growth must be 
designed by considering overall effects on women’s time allocation to home production, child-rearing, 
child education, and market production. Besides, implementation of other public policies that affect 
household decision and labor market practice can help in countering any unintended consequences of 
the specific gender-equality policy.  
 
Our model has not addressed a number of factors that have a bearing on gender equality. The 
simulation results hinge on our chosen set of specific assumptions about the model structure and its 
                                                                
16  See our subsequent research on the Republic of Korea (Kim, Lee, and Shin 2015). 
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parameters. Theoretically, a more extensive framework can be developed to incorporate other 
important variables affecting gender inequality, like the allocation of female entrepreneurial talent, 
social norms against gender equality, mobility of female workers across regions and occupations, 
endogenous determination of labor market discrimination, child labor, endogenous determination of 
bargaining power between wives and husbands, and so on. They are clearly of no less significance than 
the variables we chose for our model, but we did not address them because the magnitude of these 
other factors varies very widely across Asian countries.  
 
We plan to pursue a subsequent research that develops a more expansive model specifically 
tailored for an individual Asian country, one that could help measure more precisely the economic 
costs of gender inequality in that country and whose findings can be used in the design of country-
specific policies for promoting gender-equitable economic growth.  
 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
In this appendix we derive equations needed to solve the steady states. Then we calculate the 
balanced growth rate. 
 
The household problem is to maximize the household utility function: 
 
௧ܷ ൌ ߟ௖ ͩͩିఙ ܿ௧ͩିఙ ൅ ߟ௤
ͩ
ͩିఙ ݍ௧ͩିఙ ൅ ߟ௘௠
ͩ
ͩିఙ ൬ቀ
௣೎௡೟
ͪ ቁ
ఋ ݁௧ାͩ௠ ൰
ͩିఙ
൅ ߟ௘௙ ͩͩିఙ ൬ቀ
௣೎௡೟
ͪ ቁ
ఋ ݁௧ାͩ௙ ൰
ͩିఙ
൅ ௣ಲͩାఘ
ͩ
ͩିఙ ܿ௧ାͩͩିఙ  
 (A1) 
 
Subject to 
 
ݍ௧ ൌ ሺ݄௧௤ ൅ ݄௧௠ሻఊሾ൫݁௧௙൯
ఞሺ݁௧௠ሻͩିఞሿ ൌ ሺͩ ൅ ݂ሻఊሺ ௕ͩି௕ሻఔͪሺͩିఞሻሺ݄௧
௤ሻఊ݁௧௙ (A2) 
 
ሺͩ െ ߬ሻ݁௧௠ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧௤ሻݓ௧௠ ൅ ሺͩ െ ߬ሻ݁௧௙ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ െ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘ሻݓ௧௙ െ ܿ௧ െ ௣ಲ௖೟శͩͩା௥೟శͩ ൌ ͨ	  (A3) 
 
݁௧ାͩ௠ ൌ ݁̅ሺ ఓீ೟௣೎௡೟ೌ ே೟/ͪሻ
ఔͩሺ݁௧௙ሻͩିఔͩሺܾͪ߳௧௘ሻఔͪ  (A4) 
 
݁௧ାͩ௙ ൌ ݁̅ሺ ఓீ೟௣೎௡೟ೌ ே೟/ͪሻ
ఔͩሺ݁௧௙ሻͩିఔͩሾͪሺͩ െ ܾሻ߳௧௘ሿఔͪ  (A5) 
 
First-Order Conditions 
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ሺ݊௧ሻ   η୫ୣሺe୲ାͩ୫ ሻͩି஢ ቀ୮ౙͪ ቁ
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Since ݁௧௠ ൌ ܧ௧௠, ݁௧௙ ൌ ܧ௧௙ , ݄௧௠ ൌ ܪ௧௠ , ݄௧௙ ൌ ܪ௧௙ , ௧ܻ௜ ൌ ௧ܻ  and ௧ܰ௠,௜ ൌ 	 ௧ܰ௙,௜ ൌ ͩͪ ௧ܰ   hold in equilibrium, 
 
ݓ௧௙ ൌ ͪௗఈ௘೟೑௛೟೑	
௒೟
ே೟   (A10) 
 
and	ݓ௧௠ ൌ ͪఈ௒೟௘೟೘௛೟೘ே೟	=
ͪఈ
ቀ ್ͩష್ቁ
ഌͪ௘೟೑ሺͩି௙௛೟ೢ ሻ	
௒೟
ே೟ (A11) 
 
Dynamics for ࡺ࢚ 
 
The number of adults next period ௧ܰାͩ	is the surviving children born at time t. Since the number of 
households at time t is ே೟ͪ  and each household gives birth to ݊௧  that will survive with probability ݌௖ , the 
dynamics of ௧ܰ  follows: 
 
௧ܰାͩ ൌ ݌௖݊௧ ே೟ͪ  (A12) 
 
Savings in Equilibrium 
 
From (7) and (8), 
 
ܿ௧ ൅ ௣ಲ௖೟శͩሺͩା௥೟శͩሻ ൌ ሺͩ െ ߬ሻݓ௧
ு  (A13) 
 
Substituting (A6) into (A13) yields, 
 
ܿ௧ ൅ ௣ಲͩା௥೟శͩ ሺ
ͩା௥೟శͩ
ఎ೎ሺͩାఘሻሻ
ͩ/ఙܿ௧ ൌ ሺͩ െ ߬ሻݓ௧ு  (A14) 
 
ܿ௧ ൌ ͩͩା ೛ಲͩశೝ೟శͩሺ
ͩశೝ೟శͩ
ആ೎ሺͩశഐሻሻͩ/഑
ሺͩ െ ߬ሻݓ௧ு  (A15) 
 
Hence the saving rate ߠ௧	is 
 
ߠ௧ ൌ ͩ െ ͩͩା ೛ಲͩశೝ೟శͩሺ
ͩశೝ೟శͩ
ആ೎ሺͩశഐሻሻͩ/഑
 (A16) 
 
Since ݁௧௠ ൌ ܧ௧௠, ݁௧௙ ൌ ܧ௧௙ , ݄௧௠ ൌ ܪ௧௠  and ݄௧௙ ൌ ܪ௧௙  hold in equilibrium, total gross wage income for the 
household becomes: 
 
ݓ௧௠݁௧௠݄௧௠ ൌ ݀ିͩݓ௧௙݁௧௙݄௧௪ (A17) 
 
Then the budget constraint for the household becomes 
 
ݓ௧ு ൌ ݁௧௠݄௧௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙ ൌ ሺ1+݀ିͩሻ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙ (A18) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix   |   25 
 
Then savings ܵ௧  in equilibrium are 
 
ܵ௧ ൌ ߠ௧ሺͩ െ ߬ሻሺ1+݀ିͩሻ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙ ൌ ߠ௧	Φ݁௧௙൫ͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ െ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘൯ݓ௧௙  (A19) 
 
where Φ ൌ ሺͩ െ ߬ሻ൫ͩ ൅ ݀ିͩ൯. 
 
Interest Rate 
 
ݎ௧ାͩ ൌ ሺͩ െ ͪߙሻ ௒೟శͩ௄೟శͩ (A20) 
 
Dynamics for ࡷ࢚ 
 
ܭ௧ାͩ 		ൌ ͨ.ͭ൫ ௧ܰ௠ ൅ ௧ܰ௙൯ܵ௧ 		ൌ ௧ܰ௙ܵ௧   
ൌ Φ ௧ܰ௙ߠ௧݁௧௙൫ͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ െ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘൯ݓ௧௙   ൌ ݀ߙΦߠ௧ ௧ܻ (A21) 
 
௄೟శͩ
௄೟ ൌ ݀ߙΦߠ௧
௒೟
௄೟ (A22) 
 
௧ܻ ൌ തܻሺா೟
೘ே೟೘
௄೟ ሻ
ఈሺா೟
೑ே೟೑
௄೟ ሻ
ఈ	ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧௤ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ െ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈܭ௧ (A23) 
 
௒೟
௄೟ ൌ തܻሺ
ͩ
௞೟೘ሻ
ఈሺ ͩ௞೟೑ሻ
ఈ	ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧௤ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ െ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈ ,  (A24) 
 
where ݇௧௠ ൌ ௄೟	ா೟೘ே೟೘ and ݇௧
௙ ൌ ௄೟	ா೟೑ே೟೑ 
 
Since ௘೟శͩ
೘
௘೟శͩ೑
ൌ ሺ ௕ͩି௕ሻఔͪ , ݇௧௠ ൌ ݇௧
௙ሺͩି௕௕ ሻఔͪ  (A25) 
 
௒೟
௄೟ ൌ തܻሺ
௕
ͩି௕ሻఈఔͪ	ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧
௤ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ െ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈሺ ͩ௞೟೑ሻ
ͪఈ    
= തܻΓͩ 	ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧௤ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ െ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈሺ ͩ௞೟೑ሻ
ͪఈ  (A26) 
 
where Γͩ ൌ ሺ ௕ͩି௕ሻఈఔͪ  
 
Dynamics for Education 
 
From (6), (17) and (18), 
 
݁௧ାͩ௙ ൌ ݁̅ ቀ ఓீ೟௣೎௡೟ೌ ே೟/ͪቁ
ఔͩ ሺ݁௧௙ሻͩିఔͩሾͪሺͩ െ ܾሻ߳௧௘ሿఔͪ      
=݁̅ ቀఓఛሺͩାௗሻఈ௣೎௡೟ೌ /ͪ ቁ
ఔͩ ቀ௒೟ே೟ቁ
ఔͩ ሺ݁௧௙ሻͩିఔͩሾͪሺͩ െ ܾሻ߳௧௘ሿఔͪ  (A27) 
 
݁௧ାͩ௠ ൌ ሺ ௕ͩି௕ሻఔͪ݁௧ାͩ
௙ 	   (A28) 
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By definition, 
 
௒೟
ͨ.ͭ௘೟೑ே೟
ൌ ௒೟௄೟
௄೟
௘೟೑ே೟೑
ൌ ௒೟௄೟ ݇௧
௙     
ൌ തܻΓͩ 	ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧௤ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ െ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈሺ݇௧௙ሻͩିͪఈ  (A29) 
 
Dynamics for ࢑࢚ࢌ 
 
݇௧ାͩ௙ = ௄೟శͩா೟శͩ೑ ே೟శͩ೑ ൌ
௄೟శͩ
ா೟శͩ೑ ͨ.ͭ௣೎௡೟ே೟/ͪ
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ͨ.ͪͭ௣೎௡೟௘̅൬ഋഓሺͩశ೏ሻഀ೛೎೙೟/ͪ ൰
ഌͩ൬ೊ೟ಿ೟൰
ഌͩሺ௘೟೑ሻͩషഌͩൣͪሺͩି௕ሻఢ೟೐൧
ഌͪ 
 
= ௗఈ஍ఏ೟ሾͪሺͩି௕ሻሿഌͪ௘̅ሺ௣೎௡೟ሻͩషഌͩ ሺߤ߬ሺͩ ൅ ݀ሻߙሻ
ିఔͩ ൬ ௒೟ͨ.ͭ௘೟೑ே೟൰
ͩିఔͩ ͪሺ߳௧௘ሻିఔͪ  
 
=Γͪ ߠ௧ 	൬ ௒೟ͨ.ͭ௘೟೑ே೟൰
ͩିఔͩ ሺ߳௧௘ሻିఔͪ  
 
=Γͪ ߠ௧	ሺ തܻΓͩ ሻͩିఔͩ	ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧௤ሻఈሺͩିఔͩሻ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ െ ݌௖݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈሺͩିఔͩሻሺ߳௧௘ሻିఔͪሺ݇௧௙ሻሺͩିͪఈሻሺͩିఔͩሻ (A30) 
 
where Γͪ ൌ ͪௗఈ஍ሾͪሺͩି௕ሻሿഌͪ௘̅ሺ௣೎௡೟ሻͩషഌͩ ሺߤ߬ሺͩ ൅ ݀ሻߙሻ
ିఔͩ  
 
Steady-State Growth Rate 
 
From (A11), (A21), and (A24)  
 
௧ܻାͩ
௧ܰାͩ
ൌ ௧ܻାͩܭ௧ାͩ
ܭ௧ାͩ
௧ܰାͩ
ൌ ௧ܻାͩܭ௧ାͩ ܭ௧ାͩ
ͩ
௧ܰାͩ
 
 
ൌ തܻΓͩ 	ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧ାͩ௤ ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧ାͩ௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ାͩ െ ݌௖݊௧ାͩ߳௧ାͩ௘ ሻఈሺ
ͩ
݇௧ାͩ௙
ሻͪఈ	݀ߙΦߠ௧ ௧ܻ ͩ݌௖݊௧ ௧ܰͪ
 
 
=ͪ തܻΓͩ 	ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧ାͩ௤ ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧ାͩ௤ െ ݒ݌௖݊௧ାͩ െ ݌௖݊௧ାͩ߳௧ାͩ௘ ሻఈሺ ͩ௞೟శͩ೑ ሻ
ͪఈ	݀ߙΦߠ௧ ͩ௣೎௡೟
௒೟
ே೟ 
 
In the steady state 
 
ͩ ൅ ߛ௒/ே ൌ ͪ തܻΓͩ ሺͩ െ ݂݄௤∗ሻఈሺͩ െ ݄௤∗ െ ݒ݌௖݊∗ െ ݌௖݊∗߳௘∗ሻఈሺ݇∗ሻିͪఈ݀ߙΦߠ∗ሺ ௖ܲ݊∗ሻିͩ 
 
when ݂ increases, depending on what happens to the steady-state solutions, particularly ݄௤ , the 
steady-state growth rate can either increase or not. 
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